George Patton and Donald Rumsfeld, Horse-Drawn Carriages and Armored Humvees
General George S. Patton and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Horse-Drawn Carriages and Armored Transportation Vehicles
Several years ago I had the opportunity to have a conversation with the head of one of America's intelligence agencies. It was a fairly long conversation, at different times both one-on-one and with a few others present and contributing, at a cocktail party/reception at an academic conference following the Keynote Speech he had just given for the conference. I won't mention his name, although the conference and the reception were both advertised to and open to the general public (to the extent that academic-types would qualify as general public) and the topic of his speech and at least the part of his previous career experience that dealt with that talk's topic were public knowledge. [My guess is that the heads of our agencies are such public figures that *they* aren't the ones who "do not exist" to our society; those people are likely in lower rungs than the Directors of those agencies.]
I took this opportunity to ask him a question the answer to which I believed I already knew, but which I would have liked to have had the confirmation of someone in such a position as his. The question concerns a scene in the movie "Patton," which incidentally is one of THE most historically-accurate war movies (or movies of any type) of all time. To remind you of what was happening in 1944, the Allied armies were preparing to invade France at Normandy, with Patton and his army being used as a decoy to get the Germans to believe that the invasion would actually take place somewhere other than Normandy. Several months after the June 6, 1944 D-Day invasion, and after huge numbers of Allied forces and equipment had been moved into Normandy, Patton's decoy was no longer needed and they brought him into France to spearhead the American Third Army's advance across the center of the country. This breakout from Normandy, followed by the Third Army's dash across France, was and is one of the most remarkable achievements in military history, with units advancing on occasion over 100 miles in a day slicing through whatever minimal resistance the Germans were still offering. Within several weeks, all of central France had been liberated and Patton's Third Army was coming up to the German border--far more quickly than either the Germans or the Allies had thought possible.
Patton's advance across central France, however, was not equaled by the British and Canadian armies along the Channel coast nor by a second American army coming up from the Mediterranean coast. In other words, Patton was racing far ahead of the other Allied armies. He insisted that he be allowed to continue, that he be given the gasoline and supplies needed to continue his advance into Germany, but Eisenhower and other Allied leaders were worried that he had gone too far ahead, that he would outrun his supply lines and get cut off way ahead of the other Allied armies. Patton wasn't worried about that, and he argued--begged, pleaded--to be allowed to continue. He was shut off of the supplies needed to do so, however, and his advance ground to a halt at the German border.
[After the war it was determined that, yes, had Patton been allowed to continue, he easily could have gone into central Germany unopposed and in a matter of weeks possibly taken enough of central Germany to have ended the war in October or November of 1944. At the time, however, Eisenhower's restraint did seem like a reasonable--and safe--thing to do.]
Now enough of this history lesson and back to the movie "Patton":
There is a scene in the movie right after he is told that he will not get the supplies he needs to continue his advance. Out at the head of his army,a lead tank company encounters a German patrol in the middle of the night, of course Patton's tank company runs out of gasoline, and they both fight it out all night long. In the morning Patton comes to the front to survey the damage, look with his own eyes at this battlefield along with many others, cursing his absence of fuel and still believeing that with the fuel known to be available to the Allied armies being given to his Third Army he could win the war in a matter of weeks. He seems to be alone in that belief, as evryone tries to dissuade him of it, even members of his own staff, but Patton knows that he is right. Here is the line from the movie where he wins his argument with any who would hear it and listen to the power of it: (Patton) "You know how I know that the Germans are finished out there? The horses, it's the horses, that's how I know that the Germans are finished. The horses kept coming to me in my dreams and I couldn't figure it out, I couldn't figure out what they meant. Then it hit me--I realized that the German Army, the mighty Wehrmacht, the war machine, instigator of the "lightning war," the Blitzkrieg, the terror of all of Europe just three years earlier, has sunk so low that they've had to resort to horsecarts to move their troops and their supplies around. They're finished, I know it, and all I need is a couple of miserable gallons of gasoline to end this war right now."
[I'm sorry, I still can't watch that scene without crying; I can't even type it with a dry eye. What if, huh, what if; how many people's lives would have been spared? We can only hope that, like with all war casualties, it will mean something good someday, and that maybe it already has. What if, what if.]
What is impressive about that scene, assuming that there's some level of historical accuracy to it, is this: Here is George S. Patton, three-star general commanding hundreds of thousands of United States troops as they advance across France. All of the information that he has at his disposal, all of the secret and intercepted enemy communications and the data that comes across his desk every hour of every day about "gallons of fuel used per hour" and "number of enemy units operating at 80% capacity or above" and "ratio of bullets rationed to front-line American soldiers vs. front-line German soldiers," tank production per month American vs. German, number of pilots lost per strafing mission as a ratio of available fighter pilots, blah blah blah blah blah blah blah, all of that bureaucratic information compiled for and available to him and that he looked at every day--with all of that, what meant most to him was seeing with his own eyes how desperate the German condition truly was. And it was the horses that meant the most to him--hundreds and hundreds of pages of numerobureaucratic information were necessary and valuable, yes, but didn't mean as much to him as watching with his own eyes the desperate German Wehrmacht sink to the level where they needed to use horses.
So gee, that's really interesting--but what does this all have to do with my conversation with the head of one of America's intelligence agencies????!!!!! :-) Well, actually, it's not all that hard to tell where this is going. I reminded this gentleman of this scene from "Patton," the "horses, they're finished" scene (I didn't need to remind him of the Third Army's dash across France in 1944, he knew more about that than I ever will!), then asked him if in all of his years in the intelligence business he had ever had that type of experience, that experience of seeing with his own eyes something that finally to him helped him to make sense out of all of the data that had come across his desk. He said yes, oh definitely, yes, this has happened to me, and he obviously didn't mention anything in particular but it was very clear that both he and others like him in those positions had all had that very same kind of experience at some point somewhere sometime in their careers. No, it wasn't memorialized for the ages on celluloid, however it was there and it was something that they all knew all so well.
Now, here's the less obvious part: What does all of this have to do with Donald Rumsfeld and armored personnel carriers!?????!!!!!!
?
First of all, let me say that what I am about to get to is in no way a NECESSARY indictment of Secretary Rumsfeld. In no way am I joining any chorus (month-old now) of his critics, some (many?) of whom were merely looking for an opportunity to bring him down a peg well before the now-famous "armored vehicles" question of early December 2004. I most certainly am not calling for his resignation; with all that has gone on, goes on, and will go on I simply do not know enough to make any sort of intelligent statement on something so far above my head. That is not what I am trying to get at in any way whatsoever.
However, I *am* saying that there is something wrong when in a system people at or near the top do not have enough real personal firsthand knowledge of what is going on at or near the bottom, of the IMPORTANT matters that are going on at or near the bottom, to be able to answer a question about those matters or even to indicate that they know what those problems are. No, not every trivial matter from the bottom can be dealt with by the top--most shouldn't even reach the desks that are located at the top. American servicemen's casualties, however, are NOT the type of trivial matters that are best left out of the loops of the those at the top--indeed, they are precisely the types of things that need to be placed regularly and significantly front and center onto those desks at that top!!!! No doubt they are--I am not denying that they are so placed. As are, also without a doubt, various and sundry other numericobureaucratic papers containing pages after pages of data on number of convoys undertaken per IED attack, temperature of and pressure in pounds-per-square-inch of commonly-designed Iraqi IEDs, average age, country of origin, length of service and amount of training of average Iraqi insurgent (subdivided by region of country, probably), strength of steels used in American escort vehicles on sides, bottoms, and tops, etc. etc. etc. Blah blah blah blah blah blah blah. No doubt this is being done, every day many times over.
What seems to have been lacking, though, is a real and serious attempt to link all of that data with what can be seen with one's naked eye when one visits the front, at least from those people at or near the very top. Someone needs--needed--to walk up to a typical Humvee, armed previously with all of the aforementioned numericobureaucratic data burned into their brains, and ask the simple question "Knowing what we know, knowing all that we know, how can we run one of these things down a typical Iraqi country road without having one of our soldiers lose his left leg if one of those fucking IEDs goes off under right his car?" Maybe in Rumsfeld's presence they could throw a grenade under a Hummer and show him what damage it does--and what damage it wouldn't do if the undercarriage were armored. Certainly the casualty figures--sitting on desks right next to the strength-of-steel figures, strength-of-IED-explosives figures, miles-traveled-per-casualty figures, number-of-skilled-rebels-per-km2-per-region figures--ought to have raised a flag with someone who was reading them. No doubt they did. Why didn't anyone go out and look at a Humvee with his own eyes to see where the discrepancy was coming from, throw that grenade under there and see what damage it caused? By "someone" I mean "someone at the top," of course, someone who could actually do something about it. No, in Iraq we were never at the point where we had to resort to use horses, figuratively or most assuredly literally--it's an insult to think about it in those terms if your mind wandered in that direction, that we ever sank THAT low. We were to the point, though, where we needed to look into what exactly we were doing, and look at it very very seriously--and it shouldn't have taken the Rumsfeld press conference to bring that about.
While this is the point I set out to make, and while I am at the point where I have made it and where you now see the similarities or lack thereof between George Patton and Donald Rumsfeld and their views on the issue of troop transportation, I believe it best to add two follow-ups without which this blog would be very unfair to very many which I hope it is not going to be. One is that the Patton approach of seeing-with-ones-own-eyes-and-ears was not in any way unique to him. He may have been very good at it, but he was not alone. Dwight Eisenhower himself, in the weeks and months leading up to D-Day, spent many hours that his staff wanted him to have devoted to bureaucratic administration instead with the troops, the foot soldiers, the GIs. Good PR? Well, yes it was, but the answer that Eisenhower gave to his staff was something like "Purchase orders and Invoices aren't going to win this war, those guys out there who have to hold a hill that they've been sleeping on for six weeks without having had any hot food or baths are what's going to win this war." And he was right. Outside of the military, too, many CEOs of major corporations are known to walk in to their companies' fast-food restaurants or hotels or manufacturing plants unannounced and unrecognized just to see what's really going on without anyone knowing that they're there. (My guess is that that happens less and less today, but it still happens). Also, we know that the head of at least one of our nation's intelligence agencies knows the power and importance of this approach. So it is not unknown, historically or in the present day, inside and outside of the military, to do this.
Nor would it be fair to the military to say that they haven't already done this in Iraq. They have done so, and probably much of the time it has worked out well (just not anywhere nearly up to the standards that I believe we have a right to expect). Furthermore, after the famous Rumsfeld press conference, the Pentagon--Rumsfeld himself-- seems to be taking this whole approach far more seriously. I read that a reasonably-high-level assemblage of brass--generals, even-- is heading to Iraq to do just that--I'm glad to see that, and I just hope that they're not *so* highly-ranked generals that it'll all be a PR stunt (I hear it's a one-star General, so maybe that's at the right level). Some of these people need, NEED to be people with experience in guerilla warfare--while jungles aren't deserts, one would like to think that some people brought back from Vietnam some sense of what it's like to fight against a guerilla insurgency and what all that entails no matter what type of insurgency it is or what type of topography it is fought on. Maybe some of the people who were in Vietnam right after Tet in 1968 could go along, too, the people who saw with their own eyes what the face of a defeated insurgent fighter looks like, the post-Tet point when the vanquished and defeated Viet Cong brought out their horses in their desperation. (For those of you who don't remember the rest of the story, Walter Cronkite bailed them out by announcing our country's surrender on an Op-Ed on the CBS Evening News, and the then-President, Lyndon Johnson, wasn't strong enough to prevent him).
This hands-on, eyes-on approach wasn't--and likely never will be--Rumsfeld's style. Still, it needs to be done, it NEEDS to be an INTEGRAL element of our overall approach in Iraq. We need to have people there who can see BOTH the numerobureaucratic data AND the "see-it-with-their-own-eyes" facts, AND, we need to have leadership at the highest levels (Rumsfeld basically or whoever's Secretary of Defense) who can appreciate that type of approach. Patton? No, he's long-since died and I don't think we need anyone over there who is so totally lacking in diplomatic skills that his biography could still win an Oscar 25 years after he died. Looks like that is being done over there, finally, in major quantities, wish only that they had given those guys who are doing that the fuel and gasoline that they needed much much earlier than they have done so.
Then maybe we can look forward to the day when someone, maybe some General, maybe the head of one of our intelligence agencies, maybe even Rumsfeld himself, is riding through Iraq in his armored Humvee and he sees with his own eyes the insurgents in their desperation revert to bringing out their horses. Only this time we'll finish it then and there.
Several years ago I had the opportunity to have a conversation with the head of one of America's intelligence agencies. It was a fairly long conversation, at different times both one-on-one and with a few others present and contributing, at a cocktail party/reception at an academic conference following the Keynote Speech he had just given for the conference. I won't mention his name, although the conference and the reception were both advertised to and open to the general public (to the extent that academic-types would qualify as general public) and the topic of his speech and at least the part of his previous career experience that dealt with that talk's topic were public knowledge. [My guess is that the heads of our agencies are such public figures that *they* aren't the ones who "do not exist" to our society; those people are likely in lower rungs than the Directors of those agencies.]
I took this opportunity to ask him a question the answer to which I believed I already knew, but which I would have liked to have had the confirmation of someone in such a position as his. The question concerns a scene in the movie "Patton," which incidentally is one of THE most historically-accurate war movies (or movies of any type) of all time. To remind you of what was happening in 1944, the Allied armies were preparing to invade France at Normandy, with Patton and his army being used as a decoy to get the Germans to believe that the invasion would actually take place somewhere other than Normandy. Several months after the June 6, 1944 D-Day invasion, and after huge numbers of Allied forces and equipment had been moved into Normandy, Patton's decoy was no longer needed and they brought him into France to spearhead the American Third Army's advance across the center of the country. This breakout from Normandy, followed by the Third Army's dash across France, was and is one of the most remarkable achievements in military history, with units advancing on occasion over 100 miles in a day slicing through whatever minimal resistance the Germans were still offering. Within several weeks, all of central France had been liberated and Patton's Third Army was coming up to the German border--far more quickly than either the Germans or the Allies had thought possible.
Patton's advance across central France, however, was not equaled by the British and Canadian armies along the Channel coast nor by a second American army coming up from the Mediterranean coast. In other words, Patton was racing far ahead of the other Allied armies. He insisted that he be allowed to continue, that he be given the gasoline and supplies needed to continue his advance into Germany, but Eisenhower and other Allied leaders were worried that he had gone too far ahead, that he would outrun his supply lines and get cut off way ahead of the other Allied armies. Patton wasn't worried about that, and he argued--begged, pleaded--to be allowed to continue. He was shut off of the supplies needed to do so, however, and his advance ground to a halt at the German border.
[After the war it was determined that, yes, had Patton been allowed to continue, he easily could have gone into central Germany unopposed and in a matter of weeks possibly taken enough of central Germany to have ended the war in October or November of 1944. At the time, however, Eisenhower's restraint did seem like a reasonable--and safe--thing to do.]
Now enough of this history lesson and back to the movie "Patton":
There is a scene in the movie right after he is told that he will not get the supplies he needs to continue his advance. Out at the head of his army,a lead tank company encounters a German patrol in the middle of the night, of course Patton's tank company runs out of gasoline, and they both fight it out all night long. In the morning Patton comes to the front to survey the damage, look with his own eyes at this battlefield along with many others, cursing his absence of fuel and still believeing that with the fuel known to be available to the Allied armies being given to his Third Army he could win the war in a matter of weeks. He seems to be alone in that belief, as evryone tries to dissuade him of it, even members of his own staff, but Patton knows that he is right. Here is the line from the movie where he wins his argument with any who would hear it and listen to the power of it: (Patton) "You know how I know that the Germans are finished out there? The horses, it's the horses, that's how I know that the Germans are finished. The horses kept coming to me in my dreams and I couldn't figure it out, I couldn't figure out what they meant. Then it hit me--I realized that the German Army, the mighty Wehrmacht, the war machine, instigator of the "lightning war," the Blitzkrieg, the terror of all of Europe just three years earlier, has sunk so low that they've had to resort to horsecarts to move their troops and their supplies around. They're finished, I know it, and all I need is a couple of miserable gallons of gasoline to end this war right now."
[I'm sorry, I still can't watch that scene without crying; I can't even type it with a dry eye. What if, huh, what if; how many people's lives would have been spared? We can only hope that, like with all war casualties, it will mean something good someday, and that maybe it already has. What if, what if.]
What is impressive about that scene, assuming that there's some level of historical accuracy to it, is this: Here is George S. Patton, three-star general commanding hundreds of thousands of United States troops as they advance across France. All of the information that he has at his disposal, all of the secret and intercepted enemy communications and the data that comes across his desk every hour of every day about "gallons of fuel used per hour" and "number of enemy units operating at 80% capacity or above" and "ratio of bullets rationed to front-line American soldiers vs. front-line German soldiers," tank production per month American vs. German, number of pilots lost per strafing mission as a ratio of available fighter pilots, blah blah blah blah blah blah blah, all of that bureaucratic information compiled for and available to him and that he looked at every day--with all of that, what meant most to him was seeing with his own eyes how desperate the German condition truly was. And it was the horses that meant the most to him--hundreds and hundreds of pages of numerobureaucratic information were necessary and valuable, yes, but didn't mean as much to him as watching with his own eyes the desperate German Wehrmacht sink to the level where they needed to use horses.
So gee, that's really interesting--but what does this all have to do with my conversation with the head of one of America's intelligence agencies????!!!!! :-) Well, actually, it's not all that hard to tell where this is going. I reminded this gentleman of this scene from "Patton," the "horses, they're finished" scene (I didn't need to remind him of the Third Army's dash across France in 1944, he knew more about that than I ever will!), then asked him if in all of his years in the intelligence business he had ever had that type of experience, that experience of seeing with his own eyes something that finally to him helped him to make sense out of all of the data that had come across his desk. He said yes, oh definitely, yes, this has happened to me, and he obviously didn't mention anything in particular but it was very clear that both he and others like him in those positions had all had that very same kind of experience at some point somewhere sometime in their careers. No, it wasn't memorialized for the ages on celluloid, however it was there and it was something that they all knew all so well.
Now, here's the less obvious part: What does all of this have to do with Donald Rumsfeld and armored personnel carriers!?????!!!!!!
?
First of all, let me say that what I am about to get to is in no way a NECESSARY indictment of Secretary Rumsfeld. In no way am I joining any chorus (month-old now) of his critics, some (many?) of whom were merely looking for an opportunity to bring him down a peg well before the now-famous "armored vehicles" question of early December 2004. I most certainly am not calling for his resignation; with all that has gone on, goes on, and will go on I simply do not know enough to make any sort of intelligent statement on something so far above my head. That is not what I am trying to get at in any way whatsoever.
However, I *am* saying that there is something wrong when in a system people at or near the top do not have enough real personal firsthand knowledge of what is going on at or near the bottom, of the IMPORTANT matters that are going on at or near the bottom, to be able to answer a question about those matters or even to indicate that they know what those problems are. No, not every trivial matter from the bottom can be dealt with by the top--most shouldn't even reach the desks that are located at the top. American servicemen's casualties, however, are NOT the type of trivial matters that are best left out of the loops of the those at the top--indeed, they are precisely the types of things that need to be placed regularly and significantly front and center onto those desks at that top!!!! No doubt they are--I am not denying that they are so placed. As are, also without a doubt, various and sundry other numericobureaucratic papers containing pages after pages of data on number of convoys undertaken per IED attack, temperature of and pressure in pounds-per-square-inch of commonly-designed Iraqi IEDs, average age, country of origin, length of service and amount of training of average Iraqi insurgent (subdivided by region of country, probably), strength of steels used in American escort vehicles on sides, bottoms, and tops, etc. etc. etc. Blah blah blah blah blah blah blah. No doubt this is being done, every day many times over.
What seems to have been lacking, though, is a real and serious attempt to link all of that data with what can be seen with one's naked eye when one visits the front, at least from those people at or near the very top. Someone needs--needed--to walk up to a typical Humvee, armed previously with all of the aforementioned numericobureaucratic data burned into their brains, and ask the simple question "Knowing what we know, knowing all that we know, how can we run one of these things down a typical Iraqi country road without having one of our soldiers lose his left leg if one of those fucking IEDs goes off under right his car?" Maybe in Rumsfeld's presence they could throw a grenade under a Hummer and show him what damage it does--and what damage it wouldn't do if the undercarriage were armored. Certainly the casualty figures--sitting on desks right next to the strength-of-steel figures, strength-of-IED-explosives figures, miles-traveled-per-casualty figures, number-of-skilled-rebels-per-km2-per-region figures--ought to have raised a flag with someone who was reading them. No doubt they did. Why didn't anyone go out and look at a Humvee with his own eyes to see where the discrepancy was coming from, throw that grenade under there and see what damage it caused? By "someone" I mean "someone at the top," of course, someone who could actually do something about it. No, in Iraq we were never at the point where we had to resort to use horses, figuratively or most assuredly literally--it's an insult to think about it in those terms if your mind wandered in that direction, that we ever sank THAT low. We were to the point, though, where we needed to look into what exactly we were doing, and look at it very very seriously--and it shouldn't have taken the Rumsfeld press conference to bring that about.
While this is the point I set out to make, and while I am at the point where I have made it and where you now see the similarities or lack thereof between George Patton and Donald Rumsfeld and their views on the issue of troop transportation, I believe it best to add two follow-ups without which this blog would be very unfair to very many which I hope it is not going to be. One is that the Patton approach of seeing-with-ones-own-eyes-and-ears was not in any way unique to him. He may have been very good at it, but he was not alone. Dwight Eisenhower himself, in the weeks and months leading up to D-Day, spent many hours that his staff wanted him to have devoted to bureaucratic administration instead with the troops, the foot soldiers, the GIs. Good PR? Well, yes it was, but the answer that Eisenhower gave to his staff was something like "Purchase orders and Invoices aren't going to win this war, those guys out there who have to hold a hill that they've been sleeping on for six weeks without having had any hot food or baths are what's going to win this war." And he was right. Outside of the military, too, many CEOs of major corporations are known to walk in to their companies' fast-food restaurants or hotels or manufacturing plants unannounced and unrecognized just to see what's really going on without anyone knowing that they're there. (My guess is that that happens less and less today, but it still happens). Also, we know that the head of at least one of our nation's intelligence agencies knows the power and importance of this approach. So it is not unknown, historically or in the present day, inside and outside of the military, to do this.
Nor would it be fair to the military to say that they haven't already done this in Iraq. They have done so, and probably much of the time it has worked out well (just not anywhere nearly up to the standards that I believe we have a right to expect). Furthermore, after the famous Rumsfeld press conference, the Pentagon--Rumsfeld himself-- seems to be taking this whole approach far more seriously. I read that a reasonably-high-level assemblage of brass--generals, even-- is heading to Iraq to do just that--I'm glad to see that, and I just hope that they're not *so* highly-ranked generals that it'll all be a PR stunt (I hear it's a one-star General, so maybe that's at the right level). Some of these people need, NEED to be people with experience in guerilla warfare--while jungles aren't deserts, one would like to think that some people brought back from Vietnam some sense of what it's like to fight against a guerilla insurgency and what all that entails no matter what type of insurgency it is or what type of topography it is fought on. Maybe some of the people who were in Vietnam right after Tet in 1968 could go along, too, the people who saw with their own eyes what the face of a defeated insurgent fighter looks like, the post-Tet point when the vanquished and defeated Viet Cong brought out their horses in their desperation. (For those of you who don't remember the rest of the story, Walter Cronkite bailed them out by announcing our country's surrender on an Op-Ed on the CBS Evening News, and the then-President, Lyndon Johnson, wasn't strong enough to prevent him).
This hands-on, eyes-on approach wasn't--and likely never will be--Rumsfeld's style. Still, it needs to be done, it NEEDS to be an INTEGRAL element of our overall approach in Iraq. We need to have people there who can see BOTH the numerobureaucratic data AND the "see-it-with-their-own-eyes" facts, AND, we need to have leadership at the highest levels (Rumsfeld basically or whoever's Secretary of Defense) who can appreciate that type of approach. Patton? No, he's long-since died and I don't think we need anyone over there who is so totally lacking in diplomatic skills that his biography could still win an Oscar 25 years after he died. Looks like that is being done over there, finally, in major quantities, wish only that they had given those guys who are doing that the fuel and gasoline that they needed much much earlier than they have done so.
Then maybe we can look forward to the day when someone, maybe some General, maybe the head of one of our intelligence agencies, maybe even Rumsfeld himself, is riding through Iraq in his armored Humvee and he sees with his own eyes the insurgents in their desperation revert to bringing out their horses. Only this time we'll finish it then and there.
